China’s Expanding Military Capabilities Pose Increasing Threat to Australia
Analysis indicates that China’s rapid growth in its nuclear-powered submarine fleet and long-range missile stockpile is significantly enhancing its capacity to strike targets within Australia. This threat is projected to escalate considerably over the next decade, according to a new study.
The comprehensive report highlights that China’s existing capabilities to target the Australian mainland are poised for a substantial boost. Key developments include the introduction of a new long-range bomber to its military inventory and the potential to deploy existing assets closer to Australia through a newly established military base in the Pacific region. These findings are based on an examination of publicly available intelligence concerning China’s military modernization efforts.
Submarine Fleet Expansion and Strategic Implications
Projections suggest the Chinese navy will command a fleet of 25 nuclear-powered attack submarines by 2035, a significant increase from the current estimated nine. In comparison, Australia is slated to receive its second such vessel, a United States Virginia-class submarine, by the same year under the AUKUS agreement.
While Australia’s geographical distance from China remains a strategic advantage, analysts Sam Roggeveen and David Vallance assert that the direct threat of attack is substantial and on the rise. This threat is primarily expected to manifest through missiles launched from surface ships, submarines, and potentially from Chinese territory itself.
“China is already capable of striking northern Australia with ballistic missiles deployed from its outposts in the South China Sea, and its capacity to target the Australian landmass from Chinese territory will expand over the coming decade,” Roggeveen and Vallance state in their analysis, titled Understanding the Chinese military threat to Australia.
They further elaborate, “As China’s submarine fleet grows in size and sophistication, its ability to utilize these platforms for striking targets on the Australian mainland will also increase.”
Roggeveen specifically noted the dramatic expansion of China’s nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet, emphasizing their long-range operational capabilities. “They appear to be on the cusp of a building boom,” he commented.
The report forecasts that China’s Bohai shipyard in Liaoning province is accelerating production to build between 4.5 to six submarines annually. This includes an estimated three to four nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and two ballistic missile submarines per year. The authors estimate that of the 25 SSNs expected to be operational by 2035, all are likely to be equipped with cruise missiles or potentially hypersonic missiles.
A fleet of this size would provide China with the capability to conduct sustained strike operations against Australian targets, rotating submarines through patrol cycles to maintain a constant threat presence, the analysis concludes.
Missile Capabilities and Future Threats
The United States aims to produce 2.33 Virginia-class submarines annually by the early 2030s, though current production has averaged approximately 1.3 per year. The U.S. Navy currently operates 53 nuclear-powered attack submarines and hopes to increase this number to 66 by the mid-2030s.
Concurrently, the Chinese navy is significantly expanding its fleet of surface vessels, including destroyers, aircraft carriers, and frigates.
The authors of the report emphasize that their analysis does not suggest China intends to attack Australia, noting that Beijing’s primary military focus remains closer to home, particularly concerning the Taiwan Strait.
“I don’t think it’s alarmist to examine the scale of the threat through a sober, fact-based analysis,” Roggeveen stated. “The chances of a Chinese attack on Australia are small, but governments must look at capability, not just intent.”
The report underscores the critical importance for Australia to understand China’s military capabilities to effectively manage its own defense planning. “Governments cannot plan their defenses solely on the basis of what a country might do, because intentions can change in moments,” the authors argue. “Military action against Australia could occur as part of a larger war involving the United States or as a limited campaign to coerce Australia.”
The analysis explores scenarios that could involve China targeting offshore oil facilities, or attacking ports, airports, bridges, or railway infrastructure as a means of economic coercion.
The study identifies the People’s Liberation Army’s Rocket Force (PLARF) as China’s most potent means for long-range strikes against Australia. “In the event of a major regional conflict, bases across northern Australia would be targets for the PLARF,” the authors state.
“The crown jewel of the PLARF is the DF-26, the only Chinese conventional system that can reach Australia without first having to be carried within firing range by a bomber, ship or submarine.” The DF-26, a non-nuclear ballistic missile introduced in 2016, can strike northern Australia when launched from China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea.
A significant increase has been observed in China’s intermediate-range ballistic missile stockpile. These missiles, with ranges of 4,000-8,000 kilometers, could potentially reach northern Australia. China possessed virtually no intermediate-range ballistic missile capability in 2016, but forecasts indicate it could possess over 1,000 such systems by 2035.
Currently, China’s H-6 long-range bombers have limited capability to strike Australian targets. This situation is expected to change dramatically if China can establish a military base on Pacific islands, the report concludes.
