The long-awaited report investigating how county officers did not order well timed evacuations for west Altadena because the Eaton hearth threatened the group didn’t assign blame for the botched alerts, as a substitute chalking the problem as much as an evening of chaos, unprecedented circumstances and poor communication.
The 132-page report launched Thursday appeared to downplay how early the fireplace threatened west Altadena — regardless of 911 calls that reported flames and smoke within the space — and solely as soon as talked about the 19 individuals who died within the hearth, of which all however one have been discovered within the city’s western facet.
As an alternative, it as a substitute targeted on the fireplace’s “good storm,” poor preparation and the truth that the satellite-outlined “hearth entrance” hadn’t entered west Altadena till 5 a.m. after evacuation alerts have been issued, although a number of spot fires have been confirmed within the space earlier within the evening.
The unbiased investigation by consulting agency McChrystal Group, launched eight months after the Los Angeles space firestorm, got here after The Occasions revealed that the county didn’t concern evacuation alerts in west Altadena till hours after smoke and flames from the Eaton Hearth threatened the group.
Whereas areas east of Lake bought evacuation orders simply after 7 p.m. on Jan. 7, most of west Altadena didn’t obtain any evacuation alerts till 3:30 a.m. Some zones didn’t obtain alerts till nearly 6 a.m., hours after individuals started reporting hearth within the space to 911.
Officers informed the Occasions that the duty to concern evacuation orders was break up between three businesses: the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Division, the Los Angeles County Hearth Division and the county Workplace of Emergency Administration.
However Los Angeles County Sheriff Robert Luna later downplayed his division’s function, saying firefighters usually take the lead as a result of they’re “the consultants” in such conditions. The Workplace of Emergency Administration, which is in control of sending out alerts, mentioned there have been no technical points.
With out assigning blame or explaining what went mistaken, the report confirmed that between 1 and three a.m. Jan. 8, the county didn’t ship out any evacuation alerts — together with none to west Dental. The report mentioned that at the moment, “all areas [L.A. county fire officials] believed have been straight impacted by or in danger from he Eaton Hearth had already acquired an evacuation warning or order.”
However that was clearly not the case.
The primary evacuation order for west Altadena got here at 3:25 a.m., after dispatchers acquired not less than 14 stories of fireside within the space, based on 911 logs from the Los Angeles County Hearth Division obtained by The Occasions.
The report mentioned that the preliminary requires hearth didn’t match the placement of destroyed constructions, showing to query the validity of these early calls and the presence of flames. The report claimed that the primary 911 name for a hearth in west Altadena the place the construction was later confirmed broken got here simply earlier than 1 a.m. Jan. 8. — nonetheless greater than two hours earlier than evacuation orders have been issued.
The stories offers two examples of fireside division employees flagging that the fireplace could also be burning west greater than an hour earlier than evacuations alerts went out for west Altadena.
A fireplace division employees within the subject in Altadena mentioned they prompt to Unified Command employees a bit of earlier than midnight on Jan. 8 that as a consequence of excessive winds, evacuation orders ought to exit for the foothills of Altadena, all the way in which to La Canada. Unified Command employees mentioned they didn’t recall this occurring and that the fireplace entrance was not shifting west on the time.
About two hours later, at 2:18, a subject personnel from the county hearth division radioed in that they noticed hearth north of Farnsworth park shifting west alongside the foothills.
Although some officers current within the decision-making course of informed investigators they’d taken notes within the subject about evacuation selections, the notes “have been both incomplete, not time-stamped, or not maintained.”
“No official type or documentation was utilized by LACoFD, LASD or OEM to collectively and formally document which zones ought to obtain evacuation orders or warnings, the time the choice was made, or the time the zones have been communicated to OEM employees on the EOC.”
The report additionally talked about — with out naming particular individuals or businesses — that the county “had issues about over-warning” through the hearth, worrying about including confusion, panic or pointless visitors points. State tips on alert and warning methods explicitly warn towards this, as have consultants, repeatedly.
The report mentioned that primarily based on satellite tv for pc knowledge from the Nationwide Guard, the fireplace entrance didn’t cross into western Altadena till round 5 a.m., two hours after evacuation orders had been issued. The report acknowledged that 911 calls have been coming in from the world hours earlier than the orders, however categorized these incidents as “spot fires.”
The report repeatedly mentions how circumstances created a “good storm” for firefighters, whereas highlighting that have been gave the impression to be an actual focus about NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab catching hearth, which may launch poisonous fumes if ignited.
Whereas the primary initially burned eastward, firefighters quickly reported that the fireplace was spreading “in every single place abruptly” with wind gusts between 70-90 MPH.
“Evacuation selections and messages couldn’t maintain tempo with the fireplace,” the report said.
The report additionally claims that the fireplace entered west Altadena as wind speeds elevated, describing it as a “extra densely populated” space with older properties constructed with supplies that have been “extra weak to ignition.”
The report discovered a number of issues with how the county carries out evacuations. Generally, when officers evacuated a zone, they’d robotically evacuate the zone subsequent to it. However that follow was not codified and didn’t occur in western Altadena.
The three businesses in cost additionally didn’t have a single platform with which to coordinate communication, exacerbating points with decision-making throughout the fireplace response, the report discovered. Sheriff’s division employees might not have been conscious in actual time of which zones have been underneath evacuation warnings or orders, as they weren’t all the time facet by facet with different businesses at unified command, based on the report.
The report was carried out by The McChrystal Group, a consulting agency with expertise assessing authorities response to pure disasters. The report included dozens of interviews with hearth and county officers in addition to public listening periods.
Some who attended the periods mentioned they have been cathartic. Others mentioned they have been skeptical a lot would come of the county-funded report.
“I feel it’s going to be extra scorching air to cowl the county’s ass,” mentioned Shawna Dawson Beer. whose dwelling burned down within the Eaton Hearth. “I don’t anticipate any actual accountability.”
Throughout a Could 7 listening session, residents repeatedly informed the consultants that their evacuation orders had been dangerously delayed. “None of us actually acquired alerts,” mentioned one lady.
County officers largely declined to reply questions on what went mistaken with the delayed evacuation alerts, citing the continued probe. The McChrystal Group additionally didn’t reply questions, solely issuing two updates over the previous couple of months, although neither contained any substantive data.
In 2019, nearly a yr after the Woolsey hearth, a related report ready by Citygate Associates, detailed how a number of simultaneous fires strained first responders’ potential to prioritize the place to ship individuals. The blaze destroyed some 1,600 constructions and killed three individuals.
Related points have been discovered with the county’s response this January, based on the 2025 report. Each stories questioned the knowledge of additional growth in fire-prone areas, given officers’ said incapability to defend the huge variety of Californians who stay inside excessive threat areas.
A Occasions investigation additionally discovered that almost all county hearth vans didn’t shift into west Altadena till lengthy after it was ravaged by hearth. Many county hearth vans had already been deployed to the Palisades hearth and to east Altadena. Marrone mentioned the dearth of fireside vans in west Altadena most likely boiled all the way down to “human error” by hearth officers who determined the place the vans ought to transfer.
